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4 
SPEECH WITHOUT LIMITS: DEFINING INFORMALITY IN REPUBLICAN 
ORATORY1 
 
CATHERINE STEEL 
 
Introduction 
The dramatic nature of Roman forensic activity is well-attested.2 Cicero’s practice shows how 
extensively dramatic plots, characters and language could be used in court when the 
circumstances of a case made them strategically advantageous; and his theoretical works, and 
those of his successors, demonstrate the close links which could be drawn between oratorical 
delivery and the technical framework of acting. Research on the dramatic aspects of Roman 
oratory has tended to concentrate on the orator himself, the speeches which he delivered and 
his gestures and manner of speaking. To this extent, it has bought into the fiction, so carefully 
created in the surviving texts of oratory that forensic speech is under the control of the speaker. 
But the impression of Roman court practice given by Cicero’s surviving forensic speeches is 
profoundly misleading. They offer a single unbroken text, in which the orator speaks without 
interruption for one often very considerable period of time. Reality was very different. Orators 
built their cases from a combination of their own words and those elicited from the witnesses 
they summoned. They drew on the presence of the defendant and his supporters, even if the 
defendant did not in fact speak. And they were faced by the responses of the audiences, both 
the formal constituted jury who would judge the case, and those who chose to listen by standing 
within earshot of the court proceedings. 
In this chapter, I explore the informal exchanges that took place within and around 
Republican courts. Through the term ‘informal’ I seek to bring together a range of occasions 
which are connected to, but distinct from, the orator’s prepared words in the form of a 
continuous speech. Some of these exchanges, such as those with defendant and witnesses, were 
integral to court practice, and consequently could be prepared for and, to a certain extent, 
managed. Others were much more unpredictable: a corona of listeners who had no formal 
involvement with the court could be expected, but not guaranteed. Orators needed to manage 
                                                 
1 This chapter arises from research conducted during the European Research Council funded project The 
Fragments of Republican Roman Oratory. I am grateful to Andreas Serafim, Sophia Papaioannou and Beatrice 
da Vela for their invitation to contribute to this volume. 
2 Geffcken (1973); Axer (1980); Harries (2007) 129-47; Bablitz (2007). 
all these elements in a forensic case, since they had the potential to affect the outcome; but 
since they involved words exchanged with other people, not all of them benevolent,  things 
could happen in ways other than the orator hoped or expected. As a result, they showcased an 
orator’s ability to improvise. The connections between forensic oratory and public oratory more 
widely in Republican Rome can be seen in such informal exchanges and improvisatory 
capacity: in the second part of this chapter, I explore other venues for oratory, especially the 
contio, and the ways in which such venues set orators challenges in engaging in an unscripted 
and unprepared manner with their audience. The close relationship between forensic activity 
and the wider political context meant that there was a continuum of skills and dangers: forensic 
activity provided one among a number of locations for members of the elite to engage with the 
citizen body, and such engagement could go badly as well as successfully.3 
 
1. Quaestiones 
Cases, for both prosecution and defence, were built up from a combination of the orator’s own 
presentation of the case and of evidence provided by witnesses, in statements and in subsequent 
cross-examination.4 The precise balance between speech and witness evidence and the order in 
which both elements were presented varied between different courts and was subject to 
variation over time as the procedural framework of the quaestiones perpetuae was modified, 
but the importance of contributions from witnesses was a constant, as the attention paid to the 
handling of witness evidence in rhetorical texts demonstrates.5 Their words, whether spoken or 
written, were a major and indispensable contribution to the construction of a speech’s 
argument.6 Forensic advocacy needed witnesses. But witnesses were also unpredictable. Their 
statements could be and surely were very carefully prepared, but their performance in court 
could not be guaranteed.7 Moreover, the other side would call witnesses, and cross-examination 
of hostile witnesses engendered a fresh set of dangers. In De Oratore the treatment of invention 
concludes (2.294-306) with a discussion of how an orator must seek above all not to do harm 
to his case, for letting that happen is, according to Crassus (as relayed through Caesar Strabo), 
the mark of someone “wicked and treacherous” (297).8 Antonius does not fundamentally 
                                                 
3 The focus in this chapter is on the quaestiones: other law cases generally offered much less scope and 
requirement for the kind of exchange I here explore, since they were normally of much less public interest.  
4 On witnesses in Roman forensic practice during the Republic: David (1992) 422-8; Lévy (1992) 23-33; Steck 
(2006); Guérin (2015). 
5 E.g. Rhet. ad Her. 2.9-10; Cic. De Orat. 2.118-9. 
6 Butler (2002). 
7 Guérin (2015) notes that there is little evidence for any barriers to witness coaching at Rome. 
8 Cic. De Orat. 2.297: illud uero improbi esse hominis et perfidiosi. 
disagree, but takes Crassus to task for implying that only a depraved advocate would allow this 
to happen: 
 
etenim permulta sunt in causis in omni parte orationis circumspicienda, ne quid offendas, 
ne quo inruas: saepe aliqui testis aut non laedit aut minus laedit, nisi lacessatur; orat reus 
urgent aduocati, ut inuehamur, ut male dicamus, denique ut interrogemus: non moueor, non 
obtempero, non satis facio: neque tamen ullam adsequor laudem; homines enim imperiti 
facilius quod stulte dixeris reprehendere quam cum sapienter tacueris laudare possunt. hic 
quantum fit mali, si iratum, si non stultum, si non leuem testem laeseris! habet enim et 
uoluntatem nocendi in iracundia et uim in ingenio et pondus in uita. nec, si hoc Crassus non 
committit, ideo non multi et saepe committunt. quo quidem mihi turpius uideri nihil solet, 
quam quod ex oratoris dicto aliquo aut responso aut rogato sermo ille sequitur: ‘occidit.’ 
‘aduersariumne?’ ‘immo uero’ aiunt ‘se et eum, quem defendit.’ hoc Crassus non putat nisi 
perfidia accidere posse; ego autem saepissime uideo in causis aliquid mali facere homines 
minime malos.  
 
And so throughout a speech you must keep much under review so as not to run aground on 
a problem or rush into one: often a witness won’t harm your case, or will do less harm if 
he isn’t provoked; the defendant begs me and his supporters urge me to attack him, abuse 
him and cross-question him: I’m not moved, I don’t comply, I don’t do as they wish; and I 
get no praise for it; for men without experience can more easily criticise stupid things which 
have been said that praise things which wisely have not been said. What damage can be 
done if you harm an angry, sensible, serious witness! In his anger he is willing to damage 
you and his intellect gives him force and his way of life gives him weight. And even if 
Crassus doesn’t do this, plenty do so, quite often. To me then, nothing is more shameful 
than when the response to something an orator has said, or replied or answer is this 
exchange: ‘He’s done for him’ ‘His opponent?’ ‘No, himself, and his client’. Crassus thinks 
this can only happen through treachery; but I very often see men who aren’t at all bad doing 
bad things in court.9 
 
The conversation is concerned with an advocate’s capacity to damage his case in general, 
but it is striking that the handling of witnesses is used as the main example of a damaging (and 
                                                 
9 De Orat. 2.301-3. 
unnecessary) action. The situation Antonius describes is that of cross-questioning a witness for 
the other side, and implies that there are circumstances – when the witness is credible because 
of his life and intellect – when no questioning, or at least no hostile questioning, is the best line 
to follow. There is a suggestion, too, that such refusal to engage vigorously with a hostile 
witness was likely to provoke criticism from the rest of the defence team. 
Furthermore, what witnesses said could be believed, or not believed; and the judges’ 
witholding of belief was a comment on both the orator who had brought the witness forward 
and on the witness him- or herself. When, as often was the case, the witness as well as the 
defendant was involved in the political life of Rome, the reaction to a witness’ performance by 
the judges, composed of his peers, became an exercise of public judgement parallel to, if 
considerably less freighted than, the judgement delivered on the defendant himself.10 The anger 
which Antonius knew could be stirred up in a witness for the other side is a linked phenomenon: 
witnesses became angry in such circumstances because hostile cross-questioning was designed 
to undermine their credibility, with results that could potentially extend beyond the court 
itself.11 
A well-known example of this phenomenon arose from the witness evidence offered at 
Clodius’ trial on sacrilege charges in 61. Cicero gave evidence which destroyed Clodius’ alibi. 
But Clodius was still acquitted; unsurprising, then, that Cicero sought as soon as possible to re-
establish his credibility by establishing bribery, not his fallibility, as the cause of the judges’ 
decision. It is significant, too, that this act of interpretation took place in public, at a meeting 
of the Senate which took place soon after Clodius’ acquittal: Cicero gave a speech at this 
meeting, in which he attacked Clodius, but he also exchanged remarks with Clodius in what he 
describes as an altercatio: 
 
surgit pulchellus puer, obicit mihi me ad Baias fuisse; falsum sed tamen. ‘quid? hoc simile 
est’ inquam ‘quasi in operto dicas fuisse?’ ‘quid’ inquit ‘homini Arpinati cum aquis calidis’ 
‘narra‘ inquam ‘patroni tuo, qui Arpinatis aquas concupiuit’; nosti enim Marianas. 
‘quousque’ inquit ‘hunc regem feremus?’ ‘regem appellas’ inquam ‘cum Rex tui 
mentionem nullam fecerit?’; ille autem Regis hereditatem spe deuorarat. ‘domum’ inquit 
‘emisti.’ ‘putes’ inquam ‘dicere “iudices emisti”.’ ‘iuranti’ inquit ‘tibi non crediderunt.’ 
                                                 
10 Cases in which witness evidence provided by eminent men was disbelieved by the judges form the majority of 
cases which Valerius Maximus discusses in his section De testibus (8.5). 
11 See Rhet. ad Her. 2.9, where the two activities the orator needs to engage with in relation to witnesses are 
inprobatio, discrediting, and interrogatio, cross-examination; the two headings to be used for the former are way 
of life (uita) and the consistency of their evidence with other evidence (testimoniorum inconstantia). 
‘mihi uero’ inquam ‘XXV iudices crediderunt, XXXI, quoniam nummos ante acceperunt, 
tibi nihil crediderunt.’. magnis clamoribus adflictus conticuit et concidit.  
 
The pretty little boy get up and accuses me of being at Baiae; not true, but anyway. ‘Well? 
Is that like saying that I was somewhere hidden?’ ‘What has a man from Arpinum to do 
with warm springs?’. ‘Tell that’, I said, ‘to your counsel, who was keen on an Arpinum 
man’s property at the springs’ (you know about Marius’ property.) ‘How long’, he said, 
‘shall we bear this king’? ‘You appeal to a king, when Rex made no mention of you?’ (he 
had been hoping to squander an inheritance from Rex). ‘You bought a house’. ‘You would 
think’, I said, ‘that he said, “He bought a jury”’. ‘They didn’t believe you on oath’. ‘Oh 
twenty–five judges did, but thirty–one gave you no credit at all – they took their fee up–
front’. Overwhelmed by a great roar he falls silent and collapses.12 
 
It was not enough for Cicero to state that Clodius was guilty; he had to overwrite the verdict 
with a fresh interaction with Clodius in which he now came out victorious, as indicated by the 
response of this fresh audience, whose shouts, Cicero claimed, showed their support for him 
and his presentation of Clodius as one acquitted through bribery. 
The defendant could be brought forward as a witness, and he could also speak in his own 
defence.13 Even if he (or she) were silent, his presence in the court created opportunities for 
both prosecution and defence orators. He and his reactions could be used as a physical exemplar 
to support the orator’s argument, and the defendant’s capacity to evoke pathos is amply 
evidenced from the perorations of Cicero’s speeches, where his presence, and his tears, are 
demonstrations of the need to acquit, both through his manifestation of virtue and through a 
contrast with his prospective absence were he to be removed from the res publica by the 
decision of the judges.14 In such passage, Cicero can put words into his silent client’s mouth: 
so Murena orat atque obtestat the judges (Mur. 87). Milo offers a variation on this model. 
Cicero appeals to the judges not to misread the signs: 
 
nolite, si in nostro omnium fletu nullam lacrimam aspexistis Milonis, si uoltum semper 
eundem, si uocem, si orationem stabilem ac non mutatam uidetis, hoc minus ei parcere: 
haud scio an multo etiam sit adiuuandus magis.  
                                                 
12 Cic. Att. 1.16.10;  
13 Steck (2006) 120-8.  
14 So, for example, Mur. 86-90; Flac. 101-6; Sest. 144-7; Cael. 77-80; also: Winterbottom (2004) 215-30. 
 Do not feel less compassion towards Milo if, in the midst of all our tears, you see none 
from him, if his expression is unchanging, if his voice and speech are firm and unaltered: 
perhaps these should rather help him.15 
 
Milo does not engage in the expected gestures and behaviour of the defendant facing an 
imminent verdict, and we may suspect that it is this failure which forced Cicero to note and 
draw attention to the gap in order to redefine it in terms of Milo’s heroism. But the passage 
neatly pinpoints the conventions of defendant behaviour. The distinctive clothes which 
defendants were expected to assume and lack of care for aspects of their physical appearance 
also contributed to their distinctive presence in court, and were also conventions whose neglect 
created a negative impression. The defendant’s value was not confined to the emotional charge 
of his potential conviction: his physical presence could also become a guarantee of his moral 
virtues.  
A very striking example of this phenomenon is Antonius’ defence of Manius Aquillius 
early in the 1st century B.C., at which he ripped open Aquillius’ tunic open to display his scars, 
all at the front and thus indicators of his courage in hand to hand combat.16 Above all, the 
defendant needed to stay the course. Cicero records the earlier trial of one of Oppianicus’ 
alleged co-conspirators in Pro Cluentio (58-9): he structures the anecdote around the punch-
line of the defence advocate repeatedly urging the judges to ‘look!’ at the defendant, only to 
turn himself and find his client gone. But while Fabricius’ departure was as a result funny, it 
also signalled his despair in his own case. Unsurprisingly, he was convicted. 
In this group of verbal and non-verbal behaviours, the defendant was often not alone. 
Cicero’s speeches record the presence of children (whose vulnerability if deprived of their male 
parent is emphasised for pathetic effect), siblings and parents.17 Valerius Maximus records 
cases where a defendant who was generally regarded as guilty escaped conviction because of 
the feelings his relatives engendered among the judges. Thus A. Gabinius escaped conviction 
in 54 when prosecuted by Memmius because his son “under the influence of total panic threw 
himself as a suppliant at Memmius’ feet”.18 But Quintilian adds a note of caution: he has a 
                                                 
15 Cic. Mil. 92. 
16 Cic. De Orat. 2.124, 2.194-5; cf. also: Cic. Verr. 2.5.3; Flacc 98; Liv. Per. 70; Quint. I.O. 2.15.7. 
17 According to Cicero’s subsequent written presentation of the cases, Sulla, Flaccus and Sestius had their children 
present (Sull. 88; Flacc. 106 Sest. 144, 146); Caelius and Fonteius their parents (Cael. 79; Font. 48); Fonteius, a 
sibling (Font. 46-49). 
18 Val. Max. 8.1 absol. 3: consternationis impulsu ad pedes se Memmii supplex prostrauit. 
dossier of peroration mishaps which occurred because of a failure on the part of the defendant 
and his supporters to back up what the orator was saying.19 Quintilian draws on his own 
forensic experience but he also has examples from the Republican period. He notes that disaster 
is particularly likely to happen when there has been a striving for dramatic effect: praecipue 
uero cum aliqua uelut scaenice fiunt aliter cadunt.20 
Forensic oratory thus involved the orchestration, by the orator, of his own formal extended 
speech with a range of supporting material, some of it verbal, some not, but all arising from his 
interaction with other individuals, present and absent.21 This supporting material was an 
integral part of forensic practice: neither prosecution nor defence could succeed without 
evidence from witnesses and only when the defendant was speaking on his own behalf without 
colleagues can we envisage a speech without interaction between orator and defendant – and 
even in such a hypothetical case, the defendant might choose to appeal to members of his 
family. An effective orator had to prepare this material as carefully as he could but be ready to 
change tack when faced with something unexpected, whether that be what witnesses for the 
other side said or the recalcitrant behaviour of those he had organised for his own side. Cicero’s 
speeches provide metatextual indicators, such as deictic pronouns or instructions to court 
officials to read material out, which demonstrate how he used this kind of material, even though 
their actual deployment will surely have disrupted the flow of his speech as it is preserved in 
the versions he disseminated. 
Interaction with witnesses, clients and clients’ entourages do not, however, exhaust the 
possibilities for informal exchange in the Republican court. The orator had also to relate to his 
audience, or better audiences: a clear distinction can be drawn between the judges and court 
president on the one hand, and everyone else who might be listening. The first group had no 
choice about their presence, and were directly obliged to participate in the process by recording 
their vote at its end. The second group, which can be described as an “informal audience”, was 
the corona, composed of any individual who wished to stand in the vicinity of the court and 
watch and listen. Such individuals were under no obligation to arrive at the start of proceedings 
nor to stay until the end and had no formal way of registering their opinion on what they heard. 
Interactions between orators and these audiences were a normal part of what happened in 
court. To a certain extent, they can be traced in Cicero’s speeches, most obviously in the 
                                                 
19 Quint. I.O. 6.1.37-49. 
20 Quint. I.O. 6.1.38, things which are designed for dramatic effect particularly go wrong. 
21 Witness testimony could be provided in written form: Butler (2002); Steck (2006) 58. Such testimony was 
insulated from the unpredictability inherent in the other situations I discuss. 
frequent appeals to iudices and to a lesser extent in the creation of a shared forensic history 
drawing on a collective identity for the judges in the quaestiones.22 Revealingly, in the 
discussion of wit and humour in De Oratore, Caesar Strabo early on identifies as faulty uses 
of humour to attack the other side which could be transferred to judges.23 Orators will have 
hoped, at least, for attention from the judges, and to avoid evoking their hostile laughter, and 
judges were obliged, in theory at least, to remain in court. But no speaker was guaranteed the 
attention of the corona: it had the capacity to form and disperse at will, and its presence and 
size could be taken as a marker of a speaker’s quality, or at least of his ability to command 
attention. For the character ‘Brutus’ in Brutus, the corona is a sine qua non for forensic oratory: 
ego uero...ut me tibi indicem, in eis etiam causis, in quibus omnis res nobis cum iudicibus est, 
non cum populo, tamen si a corona relictus sim, non queam dicere.24 His observation is 
provoked by the famous incident involved the elder Curio, who was abandoned by his audience 
at a contio.25 We may suspect a certain degree of pointed characterisation in this passage, with 
Brutus deliberately chosen to articulate the link between mass participation and good oratory 
in the strongest possible terms in keeping with his role in the dialogue to exemplify what has 
been lost to oratory with the transformation in political practice after the civil war. There may 
in fact have been significant differences between different kinds of forensic case in levels of 
coronal participation, with some (those with well-known defendants and/or lurid charges) 
attracting considerably more public interest than others. Nonetheless, the fundamental point is 
convincing: a voluntary audience was a sign of oratorical skill, and thus to be cherished. This 
attitude was not undermined by a lack of inhibition among members of the corona in their 
response to what they heard and saw. Indeed, positive signs of approbation were welcomed. 
One of Catullus’ poems record a forensic performance by his friend Calvus: 
 
risi nescio quem modo e corona 
qui, cum mirifice Vatiniana 
meus crimina Caluos explicasset, 
admirans ait haec manusque tollens 
                                                 
22 This is particularly evident as a tactic in the Verrines (in which the composition of juries is a live issue) and in 
Pro Cluentio, which engages closely with recent judicial decisions. 
23 Cic. De Orat. 2.245. 
24 Cic. Brut. 192: “for myself, at least, even in cases where our whole business is with the judges, not the people, 
I cannot speak if I am deserted by the corona”.  
25 Cic. Brut. 192, 305; also: Rosillo Lopez (2013) 294-5. 
‘di magni, salaputium disertum!’26 
 
As the meaning of salaputium is unclear exactly what made Catullus laugh is obscure, but 
the remark was clearly meant as a compliment to the speaker, and one uttered sufficiently 
loudly for at least some of the other members of the corona to hear.27 We can contrast the 
passage from De Oratore quoted above (301-3), where Antonius’ incontrovertible evidence for 
a failed forensic strategy is a sermo, a conversation: he does not identify where the conversation 
is taking place but the only relevant location is surely among members of the corona. As the 
judges could see, and hear, the reactions of the corona just as much as the orators could, a bad 
response was not simply upsetting to an orator; it could directly influence the ultimate verdict. 
In Antonius’ description of his great triumph at the Norbanus case, it is the moment at which 
he realises me in possessionem iudici ac defensionis meae constitisse, quod et populi 
beneuolentiam mihi conciliaram, cuius ius etiam cum seditionis coniunctione defenderam, et 
iudicum animos totos uel calamitate ciuitatis uel luctu ac desiderio propinquorum uel odio 
proprio in Caepionem ad causam nostram conuerteram, tum... that marks his transition the 
most emotionally charged part of his speech.28 It is not simply the attitude of the judges which 
is relevant; having the people – by which Antonius must mean those whose opinion he could 
gauge, namely those present around the court in the corona – on his side was also crucial. The 
corona mattered. Its reactions to the case being heard were available to the judges, and 
contributed to their decision; a competent orator had at the least to try to prevent it from 
behaving in a way that prejudiced his case, and ideally to deploy it as a factor in his favour.  
Effective forensic performance thus required the orator to manage and respond to a great 
many elements, not all of which were under his direct control. These had the potential to blur 
the distinction between formal and informal speech and between prepared and unprepared 
speech. Indeed, one function of a written version of a speech was to sanitise what had actually 
happened in court and, if necessary, to impose upon a messy and unsatisfactory set of 
exchanges the appearance of order and control. A clear example is Cicero’s In Vatinium, which 
offers as a continuous text the record of what would in court have involved cross-examination 
                                                 
26 Cat. Carm. 53: “I laughed at someone from the corona who, when my Calvus was unrolling the Vatinian charge-
sheet wonderfully, said in wonder, lifting up his hands, ‘Good heavens, what an eloquent salaputium!’”. 
27 Corbeill (1996) 39; on the meaning of salaputium and possible stylistic implications: Weiss (1996) 353-9; 
Hawkins (2012) 329-53. 
28 Cic. De Orat. 2.200: “that I had taken possession of the court and my defence, because I had won over the 
people’s good-will, whose rights I had defended in connection with the disturbance, and I brought over to our side 
all the judges’ opinions, either because of the crisis facing the community or through grief and longing for their 
relatives or specific distaste for Caepio, then...” 
as part of the trial of Sestius.29 Cicero records in a letter to Quintus the result of the trial, 
including its effect on Vatinius: ...Vatinium...arbitratu nostro concidimus dis hominibus 
plaudentibus.30 The speech itself, a pendant to the extraordinarily ambitious Pro Sestio, was 
designed to confirm that victory in permanent form. 
 
2. Other venues for oratory 
 
The interrelationship of formal speech with informal exchanges in forensic contexts show 
marked similarities to what happened during certain kinds of deliberative speech during the 
late Republic. Speeches delivered to the people at contiones were also liable to interruption, 
both predictable and not, and the contio itself could be used to enact an oral exchange to which 
the audience might respond, just as the corona could choose to offer a reaction to the 
performance it viewed. The similarities are surely not coincidental. Quaestiones perpetuae, 
which met regularly to hear a particular charge and at which the decision was taken by members 
of a small subset of the citizen body, were a relatively recent development in Roman legal 
practice. The first was established in 149 B.C., to hear cases of extortion (repetundae); the 
development of other quaestiones cannot be established with complete chronological precision 
but it does appear that they were only systematised as a set of fully parallel courts by Sulla very 
shortly before Cicero made his debut before a quaestio with his defence of Roscius Amerinus 
in 80 B.C.31 Prior to the establishment of the quaestiones, capital offences were judged by the 
people, and they retained that capacity throughout the Republic, even if it was almost always 
delegated to quaestiones. 
On one striking occasion it was not and the people resumed their role as capital judges, 
when Labienus prosecuted C. Rabirius in 63 B.C. on a charge of perduellio.32 The conceptual 
as well as physical space in which the people acted as judges remained open throughout the 
Republic; and once quaestiones had been created the assertion by the people of direct rather 
than indirect judgement became a move with strong popularis colouring. It can be connected 
to demands for accountability from magistrates, as appears to be the case with special 
quaestiones set up in the later 2nd century, to investigate unchaste behaviour by Vestal Virgins 
                                                 
29 Pocock (1926); Bensi (2009) 427-58; Corbeill (1996) 49-55. 
30 Cic. Qfr. 2.1.1, we cut up Vatinius at our pleasure, to great applause from gods and men. Divine approval 
presumably involved some meteorological or avian phenomenon. Cicero notes later in the letter that Vatinius left 
the court ‘upset and damaged’ (perturbatus debilitatusque) but his speech was not the only cause: a prosecution 
against Vatinius had been promised by others present. 
31 Lintott (2004) 61-78. 
32 Lintott (2008) 120-5. 
and misconduct by magistrates in connection with the war with Jugurtha.33 The policing of 
behaviour which affected the res publica was a matter for all citizens.34 Their oversight was, 
by the end of the Republic, largely delegated to the quaestiones perpetuae, but control could 
be reasserted. 
It is in this sense, that of the intimate connection between the well-being of the res publica 
and the behaviour of its magistrates, that the quaestiones were political. The offences they 
considered were committable most easily, or in cases only, by magistrates and those seeking 
such office; as a result, the verdicts had political significance. This remains the case even if, as 
Riggsby has argued, what we know of jury deliberations indicates that judges reached their 
decision, and were expected so to do, on the basis of the evidence in front of them and not as 
the result of pre-existing support or hostility towards the defendant, however that might have 
been engendered.35 Trials at quaestiones were political because of their content, and 
consequently the identity of defendants; but they were probably not, or only very rarely, 
political in the sense that animosities and oppositions developed elsewhere in the public sphere 
found articulation in the votes cast by judges. 
The inherently political nature of forensic quaestiones, and their development out of a 
situation in which the people judged, helps to explain the similarities between aspects of 
forensic performance into other areas of public life. There was an annual process of judgement 
– though not in a forensic context, nor with a specific focus on wrong-doing – in Roman 
elections, where the people reached a collective decision about the identity of those they wished 
to serve them as magistrates. In contrast with other aspects of Roman public life, formal oratory 
did not play a role in the process of elections; but other kinds of speech could not be similarly 
controlled.36 Failure to respond appropriately or adequately to informal challenge, query or 
observation by the electorate could prejudice a candidate’s chance to win. Such exchanges 
became part of the persona a candidate presented and the narrative which he offered; facility 
in managing them, insofar as they were amenable to management, was a useful skill. Cicero 
gives a revealing portrait of the expectations of a candidate in his defence of Plancius on 
charges of electoral bribery, and Valerius Maximus has an entire section devoted to electoral 
defeats which indicate the pitfalls attached to inappropriate interaction with the people, whether 
                                                 
33 Vestal Virgins: 113, quaestio presided over L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla; Jugurthine war, quaestio 
extraordinaria established by a lex Mamilia in 109; also: Rawson (1974) 207-9. 
34 Riggsby (1999) 157-71. 
35 Riggsby (1999) 5-20. 
36 Tatum (2013) 133-50. 
it be ill-judged humour, as in the case of Scipio Nasica, or stinginess, as with Aelius Tubero.37 
Cicero himself capitalised on the opportunities offered by oratory in the Senate during his 
consular campaign by disseminating In Toga Candida.38 Although fragmentary and preserved 
largely in Asconius’ commentary, it is clear that the speech, though ostensibly a contribution 
to a debate on ambitus legislation, was a personal attack on his two most serious competitors, 
Antonius and Catilina. According to Asconius, Antonius and Catilina replied in kind.39 Thus a 
senatorial debate was hijacked by consular candidates, seeking to impress their senatorial peers 
with their suitability for office and – more importantly – the weaknesses of their rivals. 
Another important arena for public judgement was the census and its reviews of the 
senatorial and equestrian orders. During this process, an individual’s identity as a senator or a 
member of the equestrian class could come to an end; although the consequences were not 
remotely as severe as conviction on a capital charge, such a result was a reputational disaster. 
Senators who managed to reverse the censors’ decision by regaining their membership of the 
Senate were figures of exemplary interest.40 The people had never had oversight of the census, 
but at the very end of the Republic Clodius sponsored a law during his tribunate which gave 
those expelled or otherwise rebuked by the censors the right to a hearing.41 This measure is 
clearly in a popularis tradition of demanding accountability for magistrate’s actions: the 
censors could no longer reach arbitrary decisions about senatorial membership. As it happens, 
Valerius Maximus refers to an incident at a hearing in front of the only censors to be affected 
by this lex Clodia, Valerius Mesalla and Servilius Isauricus in 55 or 54 B.C.42 Scribonius Libo 
was being accused in front of the censors by Helvius Mancia; Pompeius Magnus, who was 
apparently present in some capacity to support Libo, commented unfavourably on Mancia’s 
age, who responded with an attack on Pompeius’ own career as a young man. What exactly 
Valerius Maximus is quoting is something of a problem when he claims to reproduce what 
Mancia said, but even if it is not Mancia’s own text, the occasion itself is revealing. Within 
what seems to have been a quasi-forensic context, perhaps when Pompeius was offering 
                                                 
37 Cic. Planc.; Val. Max., 5.7, De Repulsis; also: Cicero’s observation on the exemplum of Tubero at Mur. 76: odit 
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38 Crawford (1994) 163-203. 
39 Asc. 93-94C.  
40 The two most striking cases are perhaps Licinius Geta, on whom see Wiseman (2009) 33-57, and Cornelius 
Sura, consul in 71 and executed in 63. They lost senatorial membership in the two most expulsive censuses of the 
late Republic, in 115 and 70. 
41 Tatum (1999) 133-5. 
42 Val. Max. 6.2.8; these censors did not complete the lustrum. This lex Clodia was repealed in 52 B.C. 
testimony, an unscripted, unplanned oral exchange took place, in which Pompeius suffered 
reputational damage through his inability to control and dominate impromptu interactions.43  
 
3. Conclusions 
Public speech mattered hugely in Republican Rome, but it was not a phenomenon confined to 
formal oratory. It was not simply that the audience always had the opportunity to comment, to 
respond and to express their opinion on hearing a speech, (even though the precise form in 
which that response might emerge varied between kinds of audiences).44 The very idea of 
formal oratory, of the extended uninterrupted speech which Cicero’s speeches preserve, 
requires critique. In reality, orators needed to earn their audience, and keep on earning it, by 
offering speech which was important enough and interesting enough to hold its attention, and 
in many cases its presence. They faced interruptions, and they needed to engage with what their 
audience said and did. These demands held true across what is in other respects a deep generic 
divide between forensic and deliberative oratory at Rome. Public life in Rome involved 
constant scrutiny by the people or by those to whom the people’s responsibilities were 
delegated; that was the case even for men who were never prosecuted and thus managed to 
avoid the most intense and serious form of scrutiny offered by a quaestio. 
The theatrical metaphor is an enticing one in attempting to understand Roman oratory, 
particularly forensic oratory. It is a metaphor that the Romans themselves used, fully aware 
that oratory involved performance and that the links between dramatic and forensic delivery 
could be close. But caution is needed, to avoid importing misleading analogies along with 
useful ones. Roman oratory was never more than partially scripted. It is as though the Roman 
orator entered the stage with his own part prepared and memorised, but with less than total 
confidence in what his co-performers might say, the uneasy consciousness that at any moment 
he might be entirely upstaged by a member of the audience, and the prospect of an empty 
theatre if he failed to deliver.45 
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